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Abstract
This pair of articles provides a critical commentary on contemporary approaches to
statistical mechanical probabilities. These articles focus on the two ways of understanding
these probabilities that have received the most attention in the recent literature: the epis-
temic indifference approach, and the Lewis-style regularity approach. These articles de-
scribe these approaches, highlight the main points of contention, and make some attempts
to advance the discussion. The first of these articles provides a brief sketch of statistical
mechanics, and discusses the indifference approach to statistical mechanical probabilities.
1 Introduction
Statistical mechanics is generally taken to account for thermodynamic phenomena, such
as the melting of ice cubes in warm water, the diffusion of milk in coffee, and so on. It
does this by assigning very high probabilities to the phenomena we see (ice cubes melting
in warm water, milk diffusing in coffee) and very low probabilities to phenomena we
don’t see (broken eggs coalescing into whole ones, objects spontaneously sliding across
counters).
But how should we make sense of these probabilities? Most of the discussion in the
recent literature has focused on two kinds of proposals. First, there are the indifference
approaches, that take statistical mechanical probabilities to be measures of rational in-
difference. On these views, statistical mechanical probabilities are the credences that a
rational agent would have regarding a system given only certain information about what
the system is like. Second, there are the regularity approaches, that take statistical mechan-
ical probabilities to be part of an optimally simple and informative description of what the
world is like. On these views, statistical mechanical probabilities are sophisticated ways
of encoding the frequencies of certain kinds of events.
The merits and demerits of these two kinds of views have been subject to a lot of
analysis. In this pair of articles, I will sketch the outlines of this debate, highlight the
main points of contention, and make a few attempts to advance the discussion. In this, the
first of these articles, I’ll provide a brief sketch of the statistical mechanics, and discuss
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the indifference approach to statistical mechanical probabilities. In the second article, I’ll
discuss the regularity approach to statistical mechanics, and describe some outstanding
issues, and some areas where further research is needed.
Due to space restrictions, my discussion will be limited in several ways. First, I will
restrict my attention to the indifference and regularity approaches just described, and thus
will skip over some historically important approaches to statistical mechanical probabil-
ities. A particularly noteworthy omission is the time-average interpretation of statistical
mechanical probabilities developed by the Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1990), which is still
endorsed by a number of physicists. Second, I will assume something like the Boltzman-
nian account of statistical mechanics proposed by Albert (2000). While this is the most
widely discussed formulation of statistical mechanics in the recent literature, there are in-
teresting alternatives. In both cases, I refer those with an interest in these issues to the
more comprehensive discussions others have provided.1
2 Statistical Mechanics: Background
Let’s restrict our attention to the simplest case: classical statistical mechanics and point
particles. Here’s a first take on how statistical mechanics assigns probabilities. First fix the
static features of the world: the total energy, the number of particles, and so on. Second,
construct a space of possibilities compatible with these static constraints, with each point
of this space representing one of the possible configurations of positions and momenta that
these particles could have. Call this the phase space picked out by the static constraints.
We can call the points of this space microstates, and regions of this space macrostates.2
Given that the world is in some region B of this space, the statistical mechanical probabil-
ity of it being in some region A is equal to the proportion of the B region that A occupies
(where the sizes of these regions are determined by a particular measure called the “Liou-
ville measure”).3
This characterization of statistical mechanics seems to get a lot right.4 If we look at a
cup containing a half-melted ice cube in hot water, it will correctly predict that five minutes
from now it’s overwhelmingly likely that the ice cube will be completely melted, and the
1See Sklar (1993), Uffink (2007), Frigg (2008b), and the references provided therein.
2Three comments. First, the term “macrostate” is usually reserved for regions of phase space that have been
picked out using certain thermodynamic parameters (temperature, pressure, etc). For convenience, I’m using the
term more loosely here, to refer to any region of phase space.
Second, I’ll employ the usual convention of using the terms “microstate” and “macrostate” to denote properties
of worlds as well as regions of phase space. (Where the micro/macrostate-property m is instantiated by a world
iff the point in phase space corresponding to the world lies in the micro/macrostate-region m.)
Third, although we’ve set things up by constructing the phase space of the world, one can also apply this
apparatus to isolated subsystems of the world. (In these cases, we’ll use a smaller phase space representing the
degrees of freedom of the isolated system.) So I will sometimes speak in terms of “systems” instead of “worlds”
in what follows.
3Some have argued that these precise assignments are implausible, and have advocated what amount to interval
valued probabilities instead; see Goldstein (2001), Maudlin (2007) and Albert (2009) for discussions. Similarly,
some have argued in favor of restricting the scope of statistical mechanics in some ways; see Leeds (2003) and
Callender (2009). Both of these issues are largely orthogonal to our concerns, however, so I’ll put them aside.
4Though some have raised worries regarding whether the theory does, in fact, yield the kinds of predictions and
explanations described below. For a description of some of these worries, see Uffink (2007) and Frigg (2008b).
2
water in the cup will be lukewarm. And it predicts this because, according to the Liouville
measure, the vast majority of the microstates compatible with the macroscopic description
just given will evolve into a no-ice-cube-and-lukewarm-water macrostate.
Likewise, this characterization of statistical mechanics seems to provide successful
explanations for many of the entropy-increasing processes which we encounter: why milk
diffuses when poured into coffee, why cups don’t spontaneously slide from one part of a
table to another, and so on. These explanations will be similar to the explanation just given.
High entropy macrostates are much larger than low entropy macrostates, so an arbitrarily
wandering microstate is much more likely to wander into a higher entropy macrostate than
a lower entropy one.5
That said, this characterization of statistical mechanics also seems to get a lot wrong.
Consider the question of what a cup containing a half-melted ice cube in hot water was like
five minutes ago. According to the Liouville measure, the vast majority of the microstates
compatible with this macrostate will have evolved from a no-ice-cube-and-lukewarm-
water macrostate. So this characterization of statistical mechanics predicts that five min-
utes ago the cup was filled with lukewarm water. But this is the wrong answer: the correct
answer is that five minutes ago there was an unmelted ice cube in a cup of very hot water.
The problem stems from the fact that the characterization we’ve provided is time sym-
metric. It predicts that systems had a higher entropy in the past in the same way that it
predicts that systems will have a higher entropy in the future. But the world isn’t time
symmetric. Entropy increases toward the future, not toward the past. So it seems that this
characterization of statistical mechanics will make all of the wrong predictions about what
the past was like.
One might appeal to our evidence of what the past was like to avoid this conclusion:
we remember putting the ice cube in warm water, for instance. But if we believe the
statistical mechanical probabilities, none of the evidence we have access to—memories,
photographs, books, fossils—should be believed. After all, statistical mechanics tells us
that it’s much more likely that our memories spontaneously formed from a skull full of
brain soup than it is that they’re reliable indicators of a lower entropy past, and that it’s
much more likely that our history books spontaneously formed from a higher entropy
state than it is that they’re accurate descriptions of a low entropy past. So, if statistical
mechanics is to be believed, none of our evidence about the past should be trusted.6
If our credences match the statistical mechanical probabilities described above, then
we’ll make correct predictions about future thermodynamic behavior, but incorrect predic-
tions about thermodynamic behavior in the past. If we want to believe that the world is like
we think it is—that our evidence about the past is not vastly misleading, and so on—then
we’ll need to add something to our initial characterization of statistical mechanics.
The canonical response to this problem is to add the Past Hypothesis: a claim that the
world was initially in some particular low entropy macrostate, the Past State. The Past
State is a special low entropy macrostate which satisfies certain conditions, such as having
microstates that will spread out over the accessible regions of phase space in a highly
5Though there are additional worries regarding whether statistical mechanics succeeds, or is even supposed to
succeed, in explaining phenomena of this kind. See section 3.2 for discussion of a dissenting view with respect
to the explanatory role of statistical mechanics, and see Frigg (2008b) for a discussion of some other kinds of
worries.
6For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Albert (2000) and North (2009b).
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scattered and evenly distributed way as it evolves over time.7 With the addition of the Past
Hypothesis, everything seems to fall into place: we get the right predictions about both the
past and the future, we can trust our memories, and so on.8
Note that in order for this to work, the Past Hypothesis needs to have a special status;
despite its name, it can’t be just a hypothesis about what the past is like. Here is why. The
statistical mechanical probabilities place normative constraints on our credences; namely,
our credences should line up with these probabilities in certain ways.9 Given the method
of assigning probabilities described at the beginning of this section, the probability of the
initial state being the Past State is tiny. It follows that we’re rationally required to have
a tiny credence in the initial state being the Past State as well. And we can’t avoid this
problem by saying that we’re going to adopt the Past Hypothesis as a mere hypothesis,
because the statistical mechanical probabilities make the adoption of this hypothesis ratio-
nally impermissible.
In order to get around this problem, we need to change what the statistical mechani-
cal probabilities are. On the regularity approach, as we’ll see, the statistical mechanical
probabilities are given by the laws. In order to change these probabilities, we’ll need to set
things up so that the laws yield different values. The most straightforward way to do this
is to add the Past Hypothesis to the laws and assign a probability of one to the initial state
being the Past State.
On the indifference approach, on the other hand, the statistical mechanical probabilities
are provided by an Indifference Principle. In order to change these probabilities, we’ll need
set things up so that this principle yields different values. The most straightforward way
to do this is to take the Indifference Principle to provide a measure of rational indifference
over the possibilities compatible with a given set of laws. We can then get this Indifference
Principle to yield the desired probabilities by adding the Past Hypothesis to the laws.
In either case, the Past Hypothesis needs to be given a special status, such as lawhood,
in order to do the work we want it to.
3 The Indifference Approach
The indifference accounts of statistical mechanical probabilities generally go as follows.10
First it is argued that some kind of Indifference Principle provides a constraint on rational
credence. Then it is argued that this Indifference Principle yields values that line up with
the canonical statistical mechanical probabilities. Finally, it’s suggested that the statistical
mechanical probabilities are nothing more than the values the Indifference Principle spits
out. What we’ve been calling ‘statistical mechanical probabilities’ are just the credences
that a rational agent ought to have when in a certain state of ignorance. In particular, the
statistical mechanical probability of A given B is just the credence that a rational agent
ought to have in A if their total evidence consisted of all and only B, the static features of
7See Albert (2000) and Winsberg (2004a).
8Though a number of authors have raised worries regarding whether this appeal to the Past Hypothesis works
as suggested; see Uffink (2002), Winsberg (2004a), Winsberg (2004b), Parker (2005) and Earman (2006).
9A more precise characterization of the normative constraints imposed by statistical mechanical probabilities
is offered in Meacham (2005). Meacham (2005) assumes that these probabilities are chances, but the constraints
will be the same if we adopt an indifference approach.
10Some recent defenders of this kind of approach include Schaffer (2007), Frigg (2008a) and Uffink (2009).
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the world, and the laws.11
Different versions of this approach have been subject to different criticisms. But the
two most persistent objections concern (i) the justification for adopting this Indifference
Principle and (ii) the ability of this approach to make sense of statistical mechanical ex-
planations. Let’s look at each of these worries in turn.
3.1 Objection 1: The Indifference Approach’s Normative Claims
Are Unjustified
The first standard objection to the indifference approach concerns how these principles,
and their prescriptions, are justified. In particular, why should we think that the Indiffer-
ence Principle in question has identified the correct constraints on rational belief?
There is a sizable literature detailing the problems with the various attempts to for-
mulate and justify different versions of this Indifference Principle. In some cases the
principles have been shown to be ambiguous, ill-formed or inconsistent, in others the jus-
tifications offered for these principles have been shown to rely on implausible assumptions
or to be question begging. There are too many wrinkles in this debate to provide a concise
summary; for details I refer the reader to the discussions provided by van Fraassen (1989),
Howson and Urbach (2005), North (2009a), Uffink (2009) and the references therein. For
our purposes, it suffices to say that no characterization or justification of these Indifference
Principles has received wide-spread acceptance.12
Many have taken these difficulties to refute the indifference approach. Suppose, how-
ever, that the proponent of the indifference approach grants that no satisfactory justification
for their Indifference Principle can be provided. And suppose that they take this Indiffer-
ence Principle to be a primitive postulate. How bad would this be?
That would seem to depend on whether there are alternative approaches that can do
better. And it’s not clear that the alternative approaches are any better off in this respect.
Consider, for example, the proponent of the regularity approach to statistical mechani-
cal probabilities. She will take these probabilities to be lawfully governed chances that
place a normative constraint on our credences via something like Lewis’s (1986) Principal
Principle. But providing a satisfactory justification of the Principal Principle has been a
notoriously difficult thing to do, and no one has provided a justification for this principle
that is widely accepted. Moreover, compelling arguments have been made for thinking
that no satisfactory justification of this sort is possible.13
11For convenience, I’m taking both propositions and phase spaces to be set of worlds, so we can speak of
macrostates and propositions interchangeably. In order to make this identification, I’m taking the ‘static features’
of the phase space to include all of the information independent of particle positions and momenta needed to
specify the qualitative state of a world, so that each point in the phase space corresponds to a unique possible
world (or a unique set of qualitatively identical worlds). This ensures that, no matter what the agent’s qualitative
evidence is, the macrostate/proposition B can be fine-grained enough to encode it.
12Perhaps the most popular of these approaches is the one suggested by Jaynes (1983). But this approach faces
some outstanding problems to which no widely-accepted solution has been offered; see Howson and Urbach
(2005) for a critical assessment of this approach and some recent attempts to defend it.
13See Strevens (1999) for a broad ranging discussion of the kinds of problems facing attempts to justify this
principle. See Hall (2004) for a discussion of some of the worries facing proponents of regularity approaches
in trying to justify this principle. See Loewer (2004) and Hoefer (2007) for two attempts to circumvent these
difficulties.
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If no further justification of the Principal Principle is possible, then the proponents of
the regularity approach will need to adopt it as a primitive postulate. If so, then it appears
that both the indifference approach and the regularity approach are on a par in this regard.
Both endorse certain normative constraints on rational belief, and neither is able to provide
a further justificatory story for why these normative constraints hold.
(Of course, we should be careful not to make too much of this point. Just because
both approaches need to take these normative constraints as primitive postulates doesn’t
mean that both of these postulates are equally plausible. Consider: the hedonic utilitarian
may take the injunction to maximize pleasure and minimize pain to be a primitive postu-
late. The anti-hedonic utilitarian may take the injunction to maximize pain and minimize
pleasure to be a primitive postulate. But these two views are not equally plausible.)
The worries regarding how to formulate the Indifference Principle are pressing issues
that the proponent of the indifference approach needs to resolve.14 In addition, there are
real worries regarding the justifications that have been offered to support these principles.
But although no convincing justification has yet been offered for the kind of Indifference
Principle the indifference approach requires, it’s not clear that this is a worry for the pro-
ponents of the indifference approach alone. Proponents of alternative views face similar
justificatory worries. As a result, it’s not clear that these justificatory difficulties should be
taken as a mark against the indifference approach.
3.2 Objection 2: The Indifference Approach Can’t Recover Sta-
tistical Mechanical Explanations
The second standard objection to the indifference approach concerns its ability to recover
statistical mechanical explanations. To get a feel for this worry, let’s consider a typical
statistical mechanical explanation. Suppose we have a cup of coffee, and we pour some
milk into it. We know from experience that the milk will spread out until, in a minute or
two, it is more or less evenly distributed throughout the coffee. Why does this happen?
A typical statistical mechanical explanation goes like this. Consider the macrostate
compatible with what we know about the cup of coffee and the milk, at the moment after
we’ve poured the milk in. An overwhelming majority of the microstates in this macrostate,
according to the Liouville measure, will be ones which will evolve into a state in which
the milk is more or less evenly distributed throughout the coffee. Thus when we pour milk
into coffee, it’s overwhelmingly likely that the milk will soon diffuse evenly throughout
the coffee. This explains why we’ve always observed the milk in coffee diffusing: it’s
overwhelmingly likely to do so.
Note that statistical mechanical probabilities play a key role in this explanation. If
the statistical mechanical probability of milk diffusing in coffee were very low instead of
very high, statistical mechanics would not provide a satisfying explanation for why milk
diffuses in coffee.15
But if we adopt the indifference approach to statistical mechanical probabilities, it’s
not clear that statistical mechanical probabilities can play this explanatory role. On the
14In this respect, the indifference approaches and the regularity approaches are not on a par. There has been a
growing convergence of opinion regarding how to formulate the Principal Principle, and unproblematic versions
of this principle have been formulated; for example, see Arntzenius (1995), Hall (2004), Meacham (2005) and
Nelson (2009). The same is not true of the Indifference Principle.
15See Strevens (2000).
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indifference approach, statistical mechanical probabilities are a priori and necessary facts
about what we ought to believe. And it doesn’t seem that such facts could explain the
occurrence of (particular or general) events—a posteriori and contingent facts about what
is the actually the case.16
Here are two kinds of replies one might offer to this objection. First, one could main-
tain that the indifference approach can ground such explanations, and that the critics have
simply failed to notice some of the ways in which empirical facts play a role in these ex-
planations, even on the indifference approach. Second, one could reject the assumption
that statistical mechanics provides explanations for thermodynamic phenomena, and thus
maintain that there are no explanations for the indifference approach to recover. Let’s look
at each of these responses in turn.
The first reply to this explanatory objection maintains that the indifference approach
can recover statistical mechanical explanations. According to this reply, those who have
raised this objection have failed to notice some of the ways in which empirical facts—a
posteriori contingent facts about what is the actually case—do play a role in these expla-
nations, even on the indifference approach. And when these facts are taken into consid-
eration, the reply goes, it becomes clear that the indifference approach can ground these
kinds of explanations.
What empirical facts have the critics failed to take into account? Let’s consider three
ways in which empirical facts might inform the statistical mechanical probabilities.
First, the Indifference Principle tells agents how to be indifferent in certain epistemic
situations. But the epistemic situation of an agent is an empirical matter. So the statistical
mechanical probability relevant to a given agent—the statistical mechanical probability
with which she should align her credences—is determined in part by an empirical fact:
what her evidence is. In particular, the probability relevant to an agent’s credence in A
is the statistical mechanical probability of A relative to B, where B is the macroscopic
description that encodes everything the agent knows about the world.
While this is true, it is of little help in responding to the original worry. The phe-
nomenon to be explained—the explanandum—is the diffusion of milk in coffee. And
since the macrostates A and B that pick out the relevant statistical mechanical probabilities
are fixed by the explanandum, empirical facts concerning the evidence that agents have are
irrelevant.17
Second, one might take empirical evidence to determine the measure we should be
indifferent with respect to. But this claim is problematic. It’s generally held that the beliefs
of rational agents should satisfy conditionalization. And proponents of the indifference
approach have generally endorsed this constraint.18 But if we accept conditionalization,
then empirical evidence can’t determine the measure we should be indifferent with respect
to.
16Versions of this criticism have been raised by a number of people, including Sklar (1993), Albert (2000) and
Loewer (2001).
17Of course the explanandum stated here is vague. But we can precisify the explanandum, and once we do, the
relevant statistical mechanical probabilities will fall out, in a manner completely independent of agents or their
evidence.
18One of the objections that has been raised against Jaynes’ (1983) indifference approach is its purported in-
compatibility with conditionalization; see Friedman and Shimony (1971), van Fraassen (1981) and Uffink (1996).
Jaynes’ defenders have responded by arguing that these two positions are compatible, not by arguing that we
should abandon conditionalization; see Williams (1980), Jaynes (1983) and Skyrms (1985).
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Given conditionalization, a rational agent’s current credences are fixed by her initial
credences and her current evidence. In this framework, credence constraints like those
imposed by statistical mechanical probabilities can be translated into constraints on the
initial credences of rational agents. So the indifference measure an agent is rationally re-
quired to use can change as the agent’s evidence changes iff the initial credences an agent
is rationally required to have can change as the agent’s evidence changes. But the ini-
tial credences an agent is rationally required to have can’t change as the agent’s evidence
changes.19 Thus the indifference measure an agent is rationally required to use can’t de-
pend on the agent’s evidence.
Third, putting agents aside, it might be pointed out that the statistical mechanical prob-
ability relevant to an explanandum is picked out by empirical facts—the laws, the static
features of the world, the relevant macrostates A and B. And it might be suggested that
these facts are what give the indifference approach’s explanations the empirical bite they
need. But this suggestion won’t get us out of the problem. This is because we can set up
explanations where all of these empirical facts are already provided by the explanandum.
And this leads us back to our original worry—the worry of how X (the explanans) can
explain Y (the explanandum) if X expresses a priori and necessary facts about what we
ought to believe, and Y expresses empirical facts.
(To get a more concrete feel for why this suggestion won’t work, consider the following
example. Let A be a macrostate in which milk has just been poured into a cup of coffee,
and let B be a macrostate containing all and only the microstates that will evolve into a
macrostate in which milk is evenly diffused throughout the cup of coffee. Let L express the
dynamical laws of classical mechanics, let S express the static features needed to pick out
the phase space. Explanandum: “Given that the world was in an LSA-state, why was it in
an LSB-state?” Explanans: “Because the probability of LSB given LSA is overwhelmingly
high.” On the indifference approach, the explanans is an a priori and necessary fact about
what we ought to believe, while the explanandum is an a posteriori and contingent fact
about what is actually the case.)
So it doesn’t look like empirical evidence can inform statistical mechanical probabil-
ities on the indifference approach in the right way to ground statistical mechanical expla-
nations. Thus this first reply to the explanatory objection—that the indifference approach
can recover statistical mechanical explanations—looks unpromising.
The second reply to the explanatory objection rejects the claim that statistical mechan-
ics provides explanations for various thermodynamic phenomena, such as why ice cubes
melt when placed in hot water. According to this reply, the only real explanation for why
such events occur are the classical mechanical ones citing the initial conditions and the dy-
namical laws. And since there are no statistical mechanical explanations, the objection that
the indifference approach fails to recover statistical mechanical explanations evaporates.20
It’s worth appreciating how radical this claim is. Let’s consider some of the implica-
tions of this reply.
First, note that this reply is at odds with the statistical mechanical explanations given
in textbooks, and with the experiences most people have when they’re offered statistical
mechanical explanations. According to this reply, the only real explanation for why gasses
diffuse is that the initial conditions of the universe were such that, given the dynamical
19This is because the diachronic constraints conditionalization imposes, and the agent’s credences at different
times, together ensure that the initial credences the agent is rationally required to have remains the same.
20See Schaffer (2007), Frigg (2008a), Uffink (2009) and Winsberg (2009).
8
laws, gasses diffuse. Now consider the following textbook statistical mechanical expla-
nation: the reason gasses diffuse is that the overwhelming majority of microstates in the
relevant regions are ones which will soon evolve into states in which the gasses are dif-
fused, and thus it’s overwhelmingly likely that these gasses will soon end up in a diffused
state. After being told this story for the first time, it seemed to me that I understood why
gasses diffuse better than I did before. I already knew, of course, that gases consisted of
particles, and that these particles interacted in certain ways, and that for these gases to end
up diffusing the particles would need to have initially been in a state which would yield
a diffused state given the dynamics. But it seemed to me that the statistical mechanical
explanation provided me with a deeper understanding of why gasses diffuse. According to
the suggested reply, this feeling is wholly illusory. When I heard the statistical mechanical
explanation, I learned nothing new of explanatory value. And when textbooks offer such
explanations, they do nothing to further one’s understanding of the world.
Second, as Strevens (2000) notes, this reply makes it difficult to explain why statistical
mechanics was accepted by the scientific community in the late 19th century. Statistical
mechanics didn’t make new predictions—people already knew that gases dispersed, and
so on. And people were already aware of the microphysical explanations one might give
for why a particular batch of gas molecules dispersed. So what did statistical mechanics
contribute that led people to favor it over the rival theories being proposed at the time?
The standard story is that statistical mechanics was able to provide a better explanation for
thermodynamic phenomena than its competitors. And it explained them by assigning high
probabilities to the thermodynamic phenomena we see, and low probabilities to the anti-
thermodynamic phenomena we don’t see. But if the suggested reply is correct, then the
standard story can’t be, since statistical mechanics doesn’t provide anything of explana-
tory value. So this reply makes the acceptance of statistical mechanics by the scientific
community something of a mystery.
Third, this stance undercuts more than just the usual statistical mechanical explana-
tions. As Strevens (2000) notes, since many of the explanations of other disciplines de-
pend on the usual statistical mechanical explanations, it seems these explanations will be
undercut as well.
Here’s an example. Recall the form of the statistical mechanical explanation for why
ice cubes melt when placed in hot water—when ice cubes are put in hot water, there is a
very high probability that such-and-such processes will occur, and these processes consti-
tute the melting of ice cubes. According to the suggested reply, this is not a real explana-
tion. The only real explanation for why ice cubes melt when placed in hot water is that the
initial conditions were a certain way, and the dynamical laws then led to these phenomena
occurring.
Now consider the standard explanation for why photosynthesis occurs when plants are
exposed to sunlight. This explanation assumes that various biochemical reactions will oc-
cur, which in turn assumes that a number of thermodynamic processes will occur. And
these are processes which, from the perspective of statistical mechanics, only have a very
high probability of occurring. So the form of the standard explanation for why photosyn-
thesis occurs when plants are exposed to sunlight is that when plants are exposed to sun-
light, there is a very high probability that such-and-such processes will occur, and these
processes constitute photosynthesis.
But if the standard statistical mechanical explanation for why ice cubes melt when
placed in hot water isn’t a real explanation because it relies on statistical mechanical prob-
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abilities, then the standard explanation for why photosynthesis occurs when plants are
exposed to sunlight isn’t a real explanation either. The only real explanation for why pho-
tosynthesis occurs when plants are exposed to sunlight is that the initial conditions were
a certain way, and the dynamical laws then led to these phenomena occurring. And, of
course, what goes for photosynthesis goes for most of the other explanations given in
botany, as well as in zoology, physiology, neuroscience, food science, ecology, chemistry,
and so on.
Likewise, if we follow this reply and discard statistical mechanical explanations, we’re
led to potential problems with quantum mechanical explanations. Given what we know,
something like the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics could be correct. And
if something like this theory is true, then quantum mechanical probabilities will be like
statistical mechanical ones: probabilities over initial conditions in a world governed by
deterministic dynamics. So if statistical mechanical probabilities are of no explanatory
value, then these quantum mechanical probabilities will be of no explanatory value either.
And since many quantum mechanical explanations only explain phenomena by demon-
strating why they are highly probable to occur, then we need to be prepared to discard
many of our quantum mechanical explanations.
All told, this second reply to the explanatory objection threatens to lead to a kind of
explanatory nihilism regarding most of the explanations the sciences have offered. This
seems like a heavy price to pay.
There are a number of tricky issues regarding how to understand scientific explanation,
especially probabilistic explanation. And very little of the work on scientific explanation
has made a serious effort to assess the kinds of explanations that statistical mechanics
seems to provide.21 As a result, it would be premature to draw any definitive conclusions
regarding this objection and the two replies to it that we’ve considered. Nevertheless,
the considerations examined here suggest that these explanatory worries pose a severe
challenge to the tenability of the indifference approach.22
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